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WHETHER ANCILLARY REGULATORY
BURDENS IMPOSED BY THE CLEAN POWER
PLAN UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
COMMANDEER THE STATES
Zachary Hennessee∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

In West Virginia v. EPA,1 the State of West Virginia, twenty-six
other States, and a variety of power companies and affiliates are
challenging the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) “Carbon
Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources”2 on
the grounds that, among other things, the rule unconstitutionally
“commandeers” the States.3 The rule, known as the Clean Power
Plan, seeks to reduce total carbon emissions from the power sector by
32% by 2030, relative to 2005 levels.4 States are encouraged to
achieve the reductions through state regulations, but if they decline to
promulgate their own regulations, the EPA will implement the Plan
by regulating state electricity generators directly.5
West Virginia has argued that, even under the federal option,
state officials would be forced to “facilitate the elimination or
reduction of massive quantities of fossil-fuel-fired electric
generation.”6 Because the EPA does not have the authority to
regulate in these fields,7 the Clean Power Plan necessarily relies on
Copyright ©2017 Zachary Hennessee.
∗
J.D. expected, 2018, Duke University School of Law. I am deeply grateful to Professor H.
Jefferson Powell, whose inspiration, insights, and support were invaluable in the development of
this Note and my legal education generally.
1. West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 23, 2015), filings and oral
argument transcripts, https://www.edf.org/climate/clean-power-plan-case-resources.
2. 40 C.F.R. § 60 Subpart UUUU (2017).
3. See Brief for Petitioner at 78–84, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct.
23, 2015), https://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/files/solictor_general/Final%20Opening%
20Brief%20-%20Core% 20Legal %20Issues.pdf.
4. Note: the Supreme Court has stayed the Clean Power Plan pending judicial resolution of
the litigation. Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 999 (2016).
5. JONATHAN RAMSEUR & JAMES MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44145, EPA’S
CLEAN POWER PLAN: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE FINAL RULE 2–3 (2016).
6. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 80.
7. Id.
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the labor of state regulators to accomplish its ends.8 This reliance on
state action, according to West Virginia, unconstitutionally
commandeers the States.9
Though the Clean Power Plan will likely be repealed,10 which
would render the West Virginia lawsuit moot,11 the anticommandeering argument raised in West Virginia nevertheless bears
further examination. Firstly, any future federal greenhouse gas
regulation or legislation targeting the power sector will likely be
subject to the same constitutional challenges. For instance, if
Congress were to pass a carbon tax, it would likely create similar
burdens on state regulators to monitor and enforce the provisions at
power plants.12 Secondly, many other environmental and nonenvironmental legislative and regulatory frameworks have similar
incidental burdens on states.13 West Virginia’s novel anticommandeering argument, if valid, would substantially undermine
the cooperative federalist framework of these programs. Thirdly,
delineating the constitutional extent of the EPA’s authority to issue
regulations like the Clean Power Plan would heavily influence the
viability of certain litigation strategies to address greenhouse gas
emissions, including federal common law nuisance claims.14
8. I assume for the purposes of this Note that the arguments posed by West Virginia are true:
that the Clean Power Plan does heavily burden state regulators, and that the EPA could not
accomplish its objectives without placing these burdens on them, even if it implemented a
federal plan.
9. Commandeering, as it is used in this context, is a legal term of art that refers to the
Federal Government’s cooption of state regulators or legislatures to implement federal
initiatives, which violates the Constitution. See infra Part III.A.
10. See Electric Utility Generating Units: Repealing the Clean Power Plan, EPA (Oct. 10,
2017),
https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/electric-utility-generating-unitsrepealing-clean-power-plan-0.
11. The D.C. Circuit has repeatedly granted the Trump administration’s motions to hold the
case in abeyance while the Administration seeks to repeal the rule. See, e.g., Order Continuing
Abeyance, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363, ECF No. 1703889 (Nov. 9, 2017). The court’s
willingness to grant the abeyances indicates that it will dismiss the challenge once the
Administration has completed its decision-making process.
12. See Jack Calder, Administration of a US Carbon Tax, in IMPLEMENTING A US CARBON
TAX: CHALLENGES AND DEBATES, Chapter 3 (2015) (discussing the administrative challenges
of implementing a downstream carbon tax).
13. See Respondent EPA’s Initial Brief at 104–5, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C.
Cir. filed Oct. 23, 2015) (noting that federal regulatory programs that involve similar incidental
burdens on states include state building permits issued pursuant to the Americans with
Disabilities Act, utility regulation orders issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
pursuant to the Federal Power Act, and many environmental programs, including the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act’s hazardous waste permitting program).
14. See Zachary Hennessee, Note, Resurrecting a Doctrine on its Deathbed: Revisiting
Federal Common Law Greenhouse Gas Litigation After Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,
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Accordingly, this Note considers whether West Virginia’s
argument – that a federal regulation that cannot be implemented
without placing ancillary regulatory burdens on state regulators
unconstitutionally commandeers the States – has any merit in the case
law or the Constitution. This Note proceeds in six parts. Following
Part I, this introduction, Part II summarizes the regulatory
mechanisms and requirements of the Clean Power Plan and analyzes
West Virginia’s anti-commandeering challenge. Part III discusses the
two main cases establishing the anti-commandeering principle: New
York v. United States and Printz v. United States. Part IV analyzes the
historical, doctrinal, structural, and prudential underpinnings of the
anti-commandeering principle and concludes that, though they exist
in some tension with each other, the doctrine is best understood as a
cost-benefit analysis, balancing the pragmatic necessity of broad
federal power against state procedural autonomy. Part V applies this
understanding to West Virginia’s argument and concludes that West
Virginia’s position is inconsistent with the prudential and doctrinal
rationales behind the anti-commandeering principle. Part VI provides
some concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Clean Power Plan
The EPA finalized the Clean Power Plan on August 3, 2015.15
The rule has not yet gone into effect because it was stayed by the
Supreme Court in 2016,16 and the EPA recently published a proposal
to repeal the rule.17 While the future of the Clean Power Plan itself is
dim, a basic apprehension of the rule’s structural framework is still
necessary to understand West Virginia’s anti-commandeering
challenge to the rule, and ultimately, the constitutional validity of
such a challenge.

67 D.L.J. (forthcoming, Feb. 2018) (arguing that doctrinal developments since AEP v.
Connecticut have created a potential opening for federal common law nuisance claims targeting
existing stationary sources’ greenhouse gas emissions, but that the viability of these claims
depends in part on the extent of the EPA’s regulatory authority under Clean Air Act 111(d) –
the authority EPA used to issue the Clean Power Plan).
15. 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 60 subpart UUUU (2017)).
16. Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 999 (2016).
17. See Electric Utility Generating Units: Repealing the Clean Power Plan, EPA (Oct. 10,
2017),
https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/electric-utility-generating-unitsrepealing-clean-power-plan-0.
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The Clean Power Plan targets carbon dioxide emissions from
existing fossil-fuel-fired electric utility steam generating facilities and
stationary combustion turbines.18 The goal of the Plan is to reduce
carbon dioxide emissions from the utility power sector by 32% by
2030, relative to 2005 levels.19 Each State has a specified emission
reduction goal based on its individual power mix and emission
reduction potential.20
The Clean Power Plan allows States to comply either by
developing their own state plans, or by having the EPA implement a
federal plan. Under the state plan approach, each State can select
from two types of plans: (1) an “emission standards” approach where
the State implements a federally enforceable emission rate standard
directly on the targeted electric generating facilities and combustion
turbines; or (2) a “state measures” approach where States attain the
same level of carbon reductions through a mix of federally
enforceable “emissions standards” coupled with other state law-based
reductions like renewable energy and energy efficiency upgrades.21
The “state measures” approach must also include a federally
enforceable backstop.22
Though the Supreme Court’s stay indefinitely postponed the
Clean Power Plan’s implementation deadlines, the Clean Power Plan
would have required each State to submit a state implementation plan
outlining the State’s compliance strategy by September 6, 2016, and a
final plan by September 6, 2018.23 Between 2022 and 2029, each State
was to demonstrate incremental emissions reductions as outlined in
the state plan.24 If a State failed or declined to submit a satisfactory
state plan, the EPA would have implemented a federal plan directly
on the affected electric generating units in that State.25

18. 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662.
19. Id. at 64,665.
20. Id. at 64,664.
21. Id. at 64,667–68; see also RAMSEUR & MCCARTHY, supra note 5.
22. 80 Fed. Reg. 64,667–68 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 60).
23. 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,669.
24. Id.
25. RAMSEUR & MCCARTHY, supra note 5, at 3. The EPA has proposed a generally
applicable federal plan but it has not been finalized. See Federal Plan Requirements for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Electric Utility Generating Units, Proposed Rule, 80 Fed.
Reg. 64,966 (Oct. 23, 2015).
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B. West Virginia’s Anti-Commandeering Argument
West Virginia and its co-petitioners have levelled a bevy of
constitutional and statutory challenges to the EPA’s Clean Power
Plan.26 The focus of this Note is West Virginia’s claim that the federal
regulation unconstitutionally commandeers state governments and
their officials.27 West Virginia claims that:
Whether implemented by the States or the federal
government . . . States will be required in both
instances to facilitate the elimination or reduction of
massive quantities of fossil-fuel-fired electric
generation as there is no federal means of carrying out
the numerous planning and regulatory activities
necessary to accommodate the retirement of existing
sources and the construction and integration of new
capacity.28
Thus, even if States opt out and the EPA implements its federal
plan directly on electric utilities, “state actors will be the ones to
account for the Rule’s impact on electric reliability, through such
means as ‘[public utility commission] orders,’ and ‘state measures’
that make unregulated renewable energy generators ‘responsible for
compliance and liable for violations’ if they do not fill the gap.”29 This
would result in significant incidental burdens on state regulators,
requiring them to “review siting decisions, grant permit applications,
and issue certificates of public convenience for the EPA’s preferred
generation sources and for the associated new transmission lines that
the EPA’s transformation of the power sector will require.”30
West Virginia argues that the EPA relied on state governments’
“responsibility to maintain a reliable electric system”31 in developing
its Plan. Therefore, states have no choice but to participate in the
26. See LINDA TSANG & ALEXANDRA M. WYATT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44480,
CLEAN POWER PLAN: LEGAL BACKGROUND AND PENDING LITIGATION IN WEST VIRGINIA V.
EPA, 10–16 (2017). The major arguments in West Virginia v. EPA can be broken into three
categories: 1) the EPA violated the Clean Air Act § 111(d) by establishing emission reduction
goals that included reductions “beyond the fence line” of the actual electric generating units; 2)
the sources which are already regulated under Clean Air Act § 112, which include power plants,
cannot also be regulated under § 111(d); and 3) the Clean Power Plan unconstitutionally
commandeers and coerces the States. Id.
27. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 80.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 81–82 (quoting 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,848 and 40 C.F.R. § 60.5780(a)(5)(iii)) (in-text
citations omitted).
30. Id. at 82.
31. Id. (quoting 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,678).
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implementation of the Clean Power Plan, even if they would prefer to
opt out. The only way for them to avoid assisting in implementing the
Plan would be for them to entirely remove themselves from the
electricity sector – “one of the most important of the functions
traditionally associated with the police power of the States.”32 For
West Virginia, the choice between facilitating the implementation of
the Clean Power Plan or declining to provide electric service for the
State’s citizens “is no choice at all; it is an unconstitutional ‘gun to the
head.’”33
According to West Virginia, these burdens will frustrate state
officials’ political accountability and exhaust their resources. West
Virginia cautions that state officials “‘will bear the brunt of public
disapproval’ for increased costs and lost jobs, because they appear to
retain exclusive authority under state law over electricity
generation.”34
Before evaluating the question posed in West Virginia, a deeper
understanding of the case law and constitutional underpinnings of the
anti-commandeering principle is needed.
III. THE CASE LAW
Two Supreme Court cases lay out the foundation of the anticommandeering principle, New York v. United States and Printz v.
United States.35 Taken together, these cases prohibit the Federal
Government from requisitioning the legislatures and executive
officials of the States.36 Below are the facts and holdings of both cases.
A. New York v. United States
In New York v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of three provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985.37 The Act provided three sets
of incentives to encourage the States to manage the country’s
32. Id. at 24 (quoting Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 377
(1983)).
33. Id. at 79 (quoting Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012)
(Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion)).
34. Id. at 82 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992)).
35. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of the doctrinal roots of New York and Printz.
36. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997) (“[T]he Federal Government may
not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory
programs.”); New York, 505 U.S. at 178 (“[T]he Constitution simply does not give Congress the
authority to require the state to regulate.”).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2021b et seq. (1986).
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radioactive waste.38 While all three incentives were challenged, only
the third – the “take title” provision –was found to be
unconstitutional.39 The take title provision provided that States that
did not arrange for the disposal of all internally generated radioactive
waste could be forced to take title to wastes generated within their
States, which in turn would require the State to assume liability for
any damages the waste might cause.40
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor found that the fatal
flaw of the take title provision was that it forced the States to
“choose” between to two coercive options: either the States regulate
according to Congress’s direction and facilitate the implementation of
federal legislation, or they assume ownership and liability for nonstate generators’ wastes.41 The Court stressed, “[a] choice between
two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at
all.”42 The Court noted that Congress is competent to enact regulation
respecting radioactive waste and to preempt state regulations to the
contrary and that it may use its spending powers to encourage States
to adopt regulatory regimes.43 Nevertheless, “[t]he Federal
Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program.”44 Accordingly, Justice O’Connor
concluded, “the Act [unconstitutionally] commandeers the legislative
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and
enforce a federal regulatory program.”45
B. Printz v. United States
The issue in Printz v. United States was whether a provision of
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that temporarily
required local law enforcement officers to perform background
checks on handgun purchasers unconstitutionally commandeered the

38. New York, 505 U.S. at 149.
39. Id. at 177.
40. Id. at 175.
41. Id. at 176.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 188.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 176 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S.
264, 288 (1981)). Justice O’Connor was careful to distinguish Congress’s power from the Article
III Courts’ power to order state officials to comply with state law and Congress’s ability to
“direct” state judges to enforce state law, which she said were mandated by the text of the
Supremacy Clause and Article III. New York, 505 U.S. at 178–79. See also Martin v. Hunter’s
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 324 (1816).
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States.46 The Brady Act provision was arguably a softer form of
commandeering than the take title provision in New York; it only
acted on local officials and required them to assist in the application
of federal law to private parties,47 whereas the legislation at issue in
New York essentially required the state legislatures to enact state
regulation.48
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, disputed the appropriateness
of any balancing test, writing that:
There is considerable disagreement over the extent of
the burden, but we need not pause over that detail.
Assuming all the mentioned factors were true, they
might be relevant if we were evaluating whether the
incidental application to the States of a federal law of
general applicability excessively interfered with the
functioning of state governments. But where, as here, it
is the whole object of the law to direct the functioning of
the state executive, and hence to compromise the
structural framework of dual sovereignty, such a
“balancing” analysis is inappropriate. It is the very
principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law
offends, and no comparative assessment of the various
interests can overcome that fundamental defect.49
In reaching this conclusion, Printz noted that the “[p]reservation
of the States as independent and autonomous political entities is
arguably less undermined by requiring them to make policy in certain
fields than . . . by ‘reduc[ing] [them] to puppets of a ventriloquist
Congress.’”50 The fact that the law declared unconstitutional in New
York addressed the whole State instead of individual officials, as in
the Brady Act, was constitutionally insignificant.51 Accordingly,
Justice Scalia held that “[t]he Federal Government may neither issue
directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor
command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions,
to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. . . . [S]uch

46. 521 U.S. 898, 903 (1997).
47. Id.
48. 505 U.S. at 174–75.
49. Printz, 521 U.S. at 932 (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 928 (quoting Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 839 (9th Cir. 1975)).
51. Id. at 930. In so holding, Printz rejected the legal fiction of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 159–60 (1908), in this context.
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commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional
system of dual sovereignty.”52
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE ANTICOMMANDEERING PRINCIPLE
As Justice O’Connor noted in New York, the “proper division of
authority between the Federal Government and the States” is
“perhaps our oldest question of constitutional law.”53 Because the
Tenth Amendment “states but a truism that all is retained which has
not been surrendered,”54 New York and Printz acknowledged that the
answer to whether Congress can commandeer the state legislature or
executive officials, respectively, is not readily ascertainable from the
Constitution’s text.55 Instead, New York and Printz relied on three
52. Id. at 935.
53. 505 U.S. at 149. Chief Justice John Marshall would have agreed, writing nearly two
hundred years earlier that the issue “is perpetually arising, and will continue to arise as long as
our system shall exist.” M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
54. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
55. E.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 905 (“[T]here is no constitutional text speaking to this precise
question.”). Nevertheless, Justice Scalia perplexingly suggested that the anti-commandeering
principle might be embodied in a substantive limit imposed by the word “proper” in the
Necessary and Proper Clause. See Printz, 521 U.S. 923–24. Justice Scalia cited an article written
by Gary Lawson and Patricia Granger who argued that:
the word ‘proper’ serves a critical, although previously largely
unacknowledged, constitutional purpose by requiring executory laws to be
peculiarly within Congress’s domain or jurisdiction—that is, by requiring that
such laws not usurp or expand the constitutional powers of any federal
institutions or infringe on the retained rights of the states or of individuals.
Id. (citing Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 297–326, 330–33 (1993)).
This reading is a significant departure from longstanding legal consensus. For instance, in
Attorney General Randolph’s letter to President Washington opining on the unconstitutionality
of the Bank Bill, he conceded that the word “proper” was more likely than not a surplusage
“which as often proceeds from inattention as caution.” Edmund Randolph, The Constitutionality
of the Bank Bill, No. 1, at 5–6 (1791). Chief Justice John Marshall thought that the whole clause
was unnecessary, but that if anything, it should be construed as an affirmative grant of power to
Congress to make laws incidental to its expressed powers. In his rebuttal to Judge Spencer
Roane’s critique of M’Culloch v. Maryland, he wrote of the Necessary and Proper Clause: “if no
other motive for its insertion can be suggested, a sufficient one is found in the desire to remove
all doubts respecting the right to legislate on that vast mass of incidental powers which must be
involved in the constitution, if that instrument be not a splendid bauble.” John Marshall, A
Friend of the Constitution III, at 45 (1819). And though he reached the opposite conclusion on
Congress’s implied powers, Judge Roane also thought the Necessary and Proper Clause was
doing no work. Spencer Roane, Hampden II (1819). Perhaps for these reasons, Justice Scalia
placed little weight on the word, emphasizing instead that “[o]ur system of dual sovereignty is
reflected in numerous constitutional provisions,” and “[i]t is not at all unusual for our resolution
of a significant constitutional question to rest upon reasonable implications.” Printz, 521 U.S. at
923 n.13.
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principal lines of reasoning in reaching their respective conclusions
that federal commandeering of state legislatures and officials
contravenes the Constitution’s federalism. They are, broadly:
historical, doctrinal, and structural and prudential considerations. This
Part considers and critiques each argument in turn.
A. Historical Understanding and Practice
New York and Printz both began their anti-commandeering
analyses by reference to “historical understanding and practice.”56
New York focused on the historical record and original intent of the
Framers and concluded that “the Framers explicitly chose a
Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to regulate
individuals, not States.”57 Printz agreed with New York’s analysis,58
but, perhaps recognizing that the Framers were more ambivalent
about the commandeering of state officials, focused instead on the
evidence of historical Congressional practice.59
In her opinion in New York, Justice O’Connor traced the anticommandeering principle to the transition from the Articles of
Confederation to the Constitution.60 The Articles of Confederation,
she noted, acted only against the States and not individuals, and this
inadequacy “was responsible in part for the Constitutional
Convention.”61 To Justice O’Connor, the Framers’ rejection of the
Congressional powers outlined in the Articles of Confederation was
evidence that the new Constitution was intended to enable Congress
to “exercise its legislative authority directly over individuals, rather
than over States.”62
However, while it is clear that the Constitution was intended to
cure a defect in the Articles of Confederation by operating against
individuals, it is not clear that it was also intended to preclude
Congress from operating against the state legislatures too. Like so

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Printz, 521 U.S. at 905.
New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
Printz, 521 U.S. at 920.
Id. at 906–09.
New York, 505 U.S. at 163.
Id.
Id. at 165.

Hennessee - Macros (Do Not Delete)

Fall 2017]

CLEAN POWER PLAN – COMMANDEER THE STATES

2/15/2018 5:30 PM

181

many other issues of early constitutional law, people disagreed.63 For
instance, Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist No. 27:
It merits particular attention . . . that the laws of the
Confederacy as to the enumerated and legitimate
objects of its jurisdiction will become the SUPREME
LAW of the land; to the observance of which all
officers, legislative, executive, and judicial in each State
will be bound by the sanctity of an oath. Thus, the
legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective
members will be incorporated into the operations of the
national government as far as its just and constitutional
authority extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the
enforcement of its laws.64
On the other hand, Oliver Ellsworth, a delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, explained to the Connecticut Convention:
“This Constitution does not attempt to coerce sovereign bodies,
states, in their political capacity . . . But this legal coercion singles out
the . . . individual . . . .”65 Justice James Iredell broadly agreed, noting
in his Observations on this Great Constitutional Question that “the
Const[itution] intended all Laws of the U.S. . . . should operate upon
Individuals & Not States.”66
While many in the Founding Generation seemed to agree that
the Federal Government should not requisition state legislatures,
some of those same people were not opposed to federal control of
state executives.67 In fact, some Anti-Federalists may have actually
63. See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, American Federalism: Was there an Original Understanding?,
in THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (Mark Killenbeck ed., 2001)
(suggesting that the Founders disagreed on the constitutionality and wisdom of
commandeering).
64. THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, at 174–75 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(emphasis omitted); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (stating that it
was “extremely probable, that in other instances, particularly in the organization of the judicial
power, the officers of the States will be clothed with the correspondent authority of the
Union”).
65. 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 197 (2d ed. 1863).
66. James Iredell, Observations on this Great Constitutional Question, 27 (1793). This
document appears to have been a draft of Iredell’s dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia. He
ultimately omitted most of his discussion of state sovereignty, instead limiting his opinion to the
contention that the Judiciary Act of 1789 failed to prescribe a process for hearing the case. 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 449 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting).
67. See Saikrishna B. Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1960 (1993)
(“Though the Founding Generation did not wish to permit coercion of states in their sovereign,
legislative capacities, many individuals envisioned federal commandeering of state executive
officers. Apparently, they saw no inconsistency in abandoning federal commandeering of state
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supported federal commandeering of state officials as a means of
preserving state power, both by ensuring local control over federal
regulation and preventing federal patronage from shifting the
loyalties of state officials and the people to the Federal
Government.68 Under this view, Hamilton’s The Federalist No 27, far
from being “the most expansive view of federal authority ever
expressed,”69 was actually a concession to the opponents of overly
centralized federal power.
The lessons of modern cooperative federalism legislation – where
the federal and state governments share control over the
implementation of federal statutes – appear to lend credence to the
Anti-Federalists’ vision of commandeering.70 In these cooperative
arrangements, the Federal Government depends on the States to
implement its policies. States, in turn, “use [the] regulatory power
conferred by the Federal Government to tweak, challenge, and even
dissent from federal law.”71
Because Justice Scalia was probably cognizant of the fact that the
Founders were not unanimous in the view that Congress cannot
commandeer state executives, he focused his historical arguments in
Printz on the “enactments of the early Congresses.”72 The Justice
noted that “almost two centuries of apparent congressional avoidance
of the practice” was persuasive evidence of the fact that
legislatures while at the same time permitting federal commandeering of state executives.”).
68. See Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J.
1104, 1108–12 (2013).
69. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 915 n.9 (1997). Justice Scalia also attempted to
cabin the passage, asserting that all it required was that States “enact, enforce, and interpret
state law in such fashion as not to obstruct the operation of federal law.” Id. at 913. Citing an
earlier dissenting opinion of Justice O’Connor’s, Justice Scalia argued that any language to the
contrary “appear[ed] to rest on the natural assumption that the States would consent to allowing
their officials to assist the Federal Government.” Id. at 910–11.
70. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256, 1298 (2009).
71. Id. at 1259.
72. Printz, 521 U.S. at 909. Of course, the Founding Generation disagreed on the
Constitutional value of legislative practice. Compare James Madison, Letter to Charles Jared
Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/99-02-02-2374
(explaining that he decided not to veto the second Bank Bill despite having opposed the original
Bank Bill because “the uniform sanction of successive legislative bodies, through a period of
years and under the varied ascendency of parties” amounted to “the requisite evidence of the
national judgment and intention”) with Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. 1, 28 (1815) (opinion of Roane,
J.) (“With respect to the opinions of the members of congress, who passed the judicial act, I had
not expected that they would have been quoted, to prove it constitutional. Their opinion was
already manifest, in the act itself . . . The reiterated opinions of the same men, gains nothing, on
this question of constitutionality . . . .”).
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commandeering was unconstitutional.73 On the other hand, it is also
possible that the First Congress avoided commandeering state
executives simply because it did not trust state executives to
implement federal law faithfully, and not because of any
constitutional impediment.74 It is true though, that as an historical
matter, Congress did not generally force state executives or
legislatures to implement its agenda.75 And the judiciary, it seems,
eventually took note.
B. Doctrinal Foundations
New York and Printz both sought to ground their holdings in
Supreme Court precedent. However, while the anti-commandeering
principle has historical precedent in the Supreme Court’s case law, it
was not the dominant view of the Court in the early days. It was not
until the mid-1800s that the Court held that the Constitution does not
act against the States in their sovereign capacity. Even then, the anticommandeering principle did not coalesce into a formal doctrine until
the 1980s.
The nation’s early judges were sharply divided as to the extent of
the Federal Government’s powers over the States.76 Perhaps the most
illuminating example was the early constitutional crisis that
culminated in the Supreme Court’s influential decision in 1816,
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,77 in which the Court considered whether
73. Printz, 521 U.S. at 918.
74. See Campbell, supra note 68, at 1144–45 (noting Federalist apprehension around using
state officers to enforce federal laws, as urged by Anti-Federalists who pointed to law and oaths
that bound state officers).
75. The early Congresses did enact two groups of laws that imposed obligations on state
officials to implement federal law: laws requiring state judges to enforce federal law; and the
Extradition Act of 1793, which required state executives to return fugitives from other states at
the behest of those states. Printz, 521 U.S. at 907–09. But, as Justice Scalia observed, both
groups of laws are textually permitted by the Supremacy Clause and the Extradition Clause,
respectively. Id.
76. The seriatim opinions in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 419 (1793) are
illuminative of this lack of consensus. Justice Wilson, for instance, concluded that both the text
and spirit of the Constitution demonstrated that the People rendered the States subordinate to
the Federal Government. Id. at 454–55. Chief Justice Jay, in an opinion that might have been
written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes more than a century later, wrote that it was absurd to
subject cities but not States to suit when there was no practical difference between them, asking:
“In this land of equal liberty, shall forty odd thousand in one place be compellable to do justice,
and yet fifty odd thousand in another place be privileged to do justice only as they may think
proper?” Id. at 472–73. On the other hand, Justice Iredell, in his draft dissenting opinion, argued
that a suit against a State would be “inconsistent with its Sovereign Character.” Iredell, supra
note 66, at 25.
77. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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the Virginia Appeals Court was required to follow the United States
Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.78 In the case leading
up to Martin, Hunter v. Martin,79 the Virginia Appeals Court reversed
the state trial court, which had thought itself bound by a prior
judgment of the Supreme Court, and held that the Supreme Court
had no power to compel the state courts. In his seriatim opinion for
the Virginia Appeals Court, Judge Cabell articulated a strikingly
modern version of process federalism. He observed that the
substantive powers of the State and Federal Governments overlap
considerably – both governments have jurisdiction over the same
territories and people, and “frequently [legislate] on the same
subjects.”80 However, Judge Cabell noted that the “system [would be]
deranged” if there can be no meaningful separation between the two
governments.81 Instead of attempting to carve out separate
substantive spheres for the Federal and State Governments, Judge
Cabell’s solution was procedural. “[E]ach government,” he noted,
“must act by its own organs: from no other can it expect, command, or
enforce obedience, even as to objects coming within the range of its
powers.”82 Thus, Judge Cabell created a procedural solution for
maintaining a distinction between the State and Federal
Governments by preventing either from controlling the other, while
recognizing the inevitable substantive overlap of the two
governments’ legislative prerogatives.
Writing for the Court in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, Justice Story
rejected Judge Cabell’s process federalism, both on textual and
structural grounds. According to Justice Story, the Supreme Court’s
power to review State court decisions stems not just from Article III
but also from the distinctly national texture of the Constitution
itself.83 Because it was the People and not the States that endowed the
Constitution with its powers, the People had the “right to . . . make
the powers of the state governments, in given cases, subordinate to
78. Id. at 305–06. The holding in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee is not directly in tension with
New York and Printz, as it concerned only the Judiciary’s Article III power whereas New York
and Printz only addressed Congress’s Article I power.
79. 18 Va. 1 (1815).
80. Id. at 8.
81. Id.
82. Id. Judge Roane similarly argued that “the Constitution of the United States in almost
no other instance, acts through the governments of the several states . . . . The great grievance
complained of under the articles of confederation, was, that they acted only through the
states . . . . To remedy this evil, an entire new system was adopted, by which the general
government acted directly upon the people.” Id. at 35.
83. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 338.
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those of the nation.”84 Accordingly, Justice Story observed that the
Judiciary’s Article III powers were “part of the very same instrument
which was to act not merely upon individuals, but upon states; and to
deprive them altogether of the exercise of some powers of
sovereignty, and to restrain and regulate them in the exercise of
others.”85 He continued: “It is a mistake that the constitution was not
designed to operate upon states, in their corporate capacities. It is
crowded with provisions which restrain or annul the sovereignty of
the states in some of the highest branches of their prerogatives.”86
Despite Justice Story’s rhetorical flourish, he nevertheless
avoided issuing a writ of mandamus to the Virginia Appeals Court to
enforce the Supreme Court’s prior judgment, and instead simply
reversed the Virginia Appeals Court’s decision and affirmed the state
trial court’s decision.87 This may have been to appease Justice
Johnson. Justice Johnson agreed that the Supreme Court had the
final say on matters involving federal law but rejected the notion that
the Federal Government could compel the States to act. On this
point, he was emphatic:
[S]o firmly am I persuaded that the American people
can no longer enjoy the blessings of a free government,
whenever the state sovereignties shall be prostrated at
the feet of the general government . . . that I could
borrow the language of a celebrated orator, and
exclaim, ‘I rejoice that Virginia has resisted.’88
While the Court has never retreated from Martin v. Hunter’s
Lessee’s view of federal courts’ power to review state courts and force
state officials to comply with federal law,89 it began to rethink its view
of Congress’s capacity to control state legislatures by the mid-1800s.
In 1842, Justice Story wrote in Prigg v. Pennsylvania that “it might
well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise of the power of
interpretation, to insist, that the states are bound to provide means to

84. Id. at 325.
85. Id. at 328 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 343.
87. Id. at 362.
88. Id. at 363 (opinion of Johnson, J.).
89. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 166–68 (1908) (upholding the power of federal
courts to enjoin state officials from enforcing unconstitutional laws); FERC v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742, 784 n.13 (1982) (O’Connor, partially dissenting) (observing that federal courts’ powers
to enjoin violations of federal law is “far different” from the power of Congress to coerce state
legislatures).
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carry into effect the duties of the national government.”90 Twenty
years later the Court had become more resolute. In 1861, Chief
Justice Taney noted in Kentucky v. Dennison that “the Federal
Government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose on a
state officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform
it.”91 And in 1868, the Court announced in Lane County v. Oregon
that “[t]he people . . . established a more perfect union by substituting
a national government, acting, with ample power, directly upon the
citizens, instead of the Confederate government, which acted with
powers, greatly restricted, only upon the States.”92
Beginning in the early 1980s, Justice O’Connor seized on the
process federalism embodied in these early cases and began
fashioning the anti-commandeering principle.93 She first articulated
90. 41 U.S. 539, 616 (1842).
91. 65 U.S. 66, 107 (1861). The Chief Justice was starkly prudential in his rationale,
cautioning that “if [Congress] possessed this power, it might overload the [state] officer with
duties which would fill up all his time, and disable him from performing his obligations to the
State, and might impose on him duties of a character incompatible with the rank and dignity to
which he was elevated by the State.” Id. at 107–08.
92. 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1869).
93. The Court’s development of the anti-commandeering principle parallels its
development of another type of procedural federalism: state sovereign immunity. The Court’s
first opinion on state sovereign immunity, Chisholm v. Georgia, was, like Justice Story’s opinion
in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, strikingly nationalistic. Both opinions took the view that it was the
People, not the States, who granted their sovereign power to the Federal Government, and
therefore were competent to subjugate the States’ sovereignty to the national government. And
from this conception of the Constitution’s nationalism, both opinions drew the same conclusions
that Article III granted the Judiciary power over state governments. Of course, Chisholm was
quickly abrogated by the Eleventh Amendment. However, in his Commentaries on the
Constitution published in 1833, Justice Story argued that Chisholm was rightly decided and that
the Amendment was a new limit on the Court’s Article III powers intended to protect warstressed State treasuries. It was not until the end of the 1800s that the Court recognized that
state sovereign immunity was a structural limit on Congress’s power, not tied to the Eleventh
Amendment’s limits on the Court’s Article III powers. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15
(1890). And like Justice O’Connor’s “rediscovery” of the process federalism embodied in
Hunter v. Martin, Prigg, Dennison, and Lane County, the Rehnquist Court eventually
rediscovered the central tenets of Hans—that state sovereign immunity was a structural limit
embodied in the principles of the Tenth Amendment, not the Eleventh. See Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 713–14 (1999).
The parallels between these two types of process federalism beg the question whether
Congress could use its Fourteenth Amendment powers to commandeer the States in the same
way it can abrogate state sovereign immunity. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 448 (1976);
see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (requiring congruence and
proportionality for Congress’s prophylactic use of its Fourteenth Amendment powers); Gregory
v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (requiring, and not finding, a clear statement from
Congress that it intended to use its Fourteenth Amendment powers to override state
sovereignty). However, since neither the Clean Air Act nor the Clean Power Plan were
promulgated with an eye towards protecting citizens’ Fourteenth Amendment rights, I do not
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the concept in a partial dissent in 1982 in FERC v. Mississippi, which
rejected a Tenth Amendment and Commerce Clause challenge to the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA).94 PURPA required
state agencies to “weigh its detailed standards, enter written findings,
and defend their determinations in state court” without giving them a
meaningful way to opt out.95 According to Justice O’Connor, this
unconstitutionally “compel[led] state agencies either to function as
bureaucratic puppets of the Federal Government or to abandon
regulation of an entire field traditionally reserved to state
authority.”96
Justice O’Connor refined her argument in a separate dissent in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,97 which
overruled National League of Cities v. Usery.98 She acknowledged that
Congress’s Commerce powers are extensive but argued that it did not
have unlimited means to effectuate them.99 Invoking Justice Marshall,
she contended that Congress’s exercise of its power must comply with
the “letter and spirit of the constitution.”100 “The spirit of the Tenth
Amendment . . . is that States will retain their integrity in a system in
which the laws of the United States are nevertheless supreme.”101 The
Court, Justice O’Connor concluded, has a duty and an ability “to
enforce affirmative limits on federal regulation of the States to
complement the judicially crafted expansion of the interstate
commerce power.”102
Finally, in 1991, Justice O’Connor clearly delineated the anticommandeering principle, albeit in dicta, in her majority opinion in
Gregory v. Ashcroft.103 The pertinent issue was whether a State’s
constitution, which required state judges to retire at a certain age, was
preempted by the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act.104
Though she resolved the issue on statutory grounds, Justice
O’Connor emphasized that if Congress were to attempt to regulate
consider the intriguing question any further.
94. 456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982).
95. Id. at 787.
96. Id. at 783.
97. 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985).
98. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
99. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 588.
100. Id. at 585 (quoting M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819)).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 587.
103. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
104. Id. at 455.
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state judges’ qualifications it would be unconstitutional because the
power of States to determine their officials’ qualifications is “reserved
to the States under the Tenth Amendment.”105
C. Structural and Prudential Logic
In addition to their historical and doctrinal arguments, New York
and Printz both bolstered their anti-commandeering holdings with
structural readings of the Constitution, which they demarcated with
prudential considerations about the real-world costs and benefits of
the doctrine.
Though not perfectly coherent in their conception of the
latticework of process federalism, New York and Printz seemed to
agree on one point: Federalism is not a prohibition on Congress’s
otherwise authorized exercise of its Article I powers, but rather a
structural limit on the powers delegated to Congress in the first
place.106 According to New York, “The Tenth Amendment . . .
restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not derived from the
text of the Tenth Amendment, which . . . is essentially a tautology.”107
“If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth
Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the
States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the
Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not
conferred on Congress.”108 Printz clarified that the fact that the States
retained “a residuary and inviolable sovereignty” is “reflected
throughout the Constitution’s text.”109

105. Id. at 463.
106. But see Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 149 (2000) (“In New York and Printz, we held
federal statutes invalid, not because Congress lacked legislative authority over the subject
matter, but because those statutes violated the principles of federalism contained in the Tenth
Amendment.”); Matthew D. Adler, State Sovereignty and the Anti-Commandeering Cases, 574
ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 158, 158 (2001) (arguing that the Tenth
Amendment’s anti-commandeering principle “is best understood as an external constraint upon
congressional power—analogous to the constraints set forth in the Bill of Rights—but one that
lacks an explicit textual basis.”). Justice O’Connor probably would not have concerned herself
much with the difference. “In the end,” she observed, “just as a cup may be half empty or half
full, it makes no difference whether one views the question at issue in these cases as one of
ascertaining the limits of the power delegated to the Federal Government under the affirmative
provisions of the Constitution or one of discerning the core of sovereignty retained by the States
under the Tenth Amendment.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159 (1992).
107. Id. at 156–57.
108. Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
109. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at
245 (J. Madison)).
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Thus, rather than itself being a structural prohibition on
Congress’s exercise of its enumerated powers, the Tenth Amendment
is better understood as a directive to the Court to determine
“whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation
on an Article I power.”110 Of course, the Court’s search for a
justiciable federalism has a “sordid” past,111 but unlike its pre-1937
attempts to limit Congress’s power with arbitrary, formalist limits on
the Commerce Clause, or its short-lived understanding of the Tenth
Amendment as a prohibition on Congress’s enumerated powers in
National League of Cities,112 the new federalism of New York and
Printz is purely procedural. Congress is not substantively limited in its
exercise of its enumerated powers; rather, it is only limited in how it
may exercise those powers.113
Having structurally arrived at the concept of process federalism,
Printz and New York outlined its contours using thoroughly
prudential reasoning.114 For Justice O’Connor, the principle value of
110. New York, 505 U.S. at 157; see also H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of
Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 639, 649 (1993) (arguing that New York’s process
federalism is essentially a rule of construction that the Courts should engage in a M’Culloch
style review as to whether a Congressional statute complies with both the letter and spirit of the
Constitution).
111. See William E. Leuchtenburg, The Tenth Amendment over Two Centuries: More than a
Truism, in THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 41 (Mark Killenbeck ed.,
2001) (describing the Courts’ ill-fated pre-1937 attempt to define a substantive limit on
Congress’s infringement into State domains); Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling Persistence of
Dual Federalism, in FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY 34, 73, n.75 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T.
Levy eds., 2014) (describing “dual federalism” as dying its first death in 1937).
112. See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding an amendment to the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2012), unconstitutional because Congress’s exercise of
Commerce Clause power imposed substantial costs upon appellants and displaced state
policies).
113. Recently, however, the Court has sought to map out some minor substantive limits on
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers in the name of federalism. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.
v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
114. Both Justices O’Connor and Scalia would likely stridently disagree that they were
doing anything of the sort. Justice O’Connor stressed: “Our task would be the same even if one
could prove that federalism secured no advantages to anyone. It consists not of devising our
preferred system of government, but of understanding and applying the framework set forth in
the Constitution.” New York, 505 U.S. at 157. However, her repeated references to the benefits
of state autonomy suggest that its advantages do matter. Additionally, as Chief Justice Marshall
demonstrated in M’Culloch, structural constitutional reasoning works when it makes sense. See
also CHARLES BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22 (1969)
(“I am inclined to think well of the method of reasoning from structure and relation . . . because
to succeed it has to make sense—current, practical sense.”); Neil Siegel, Commandeering and Its
Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L.R. 1630, 1634 (2006) (“For a federalism

Hennessee - Macros (Do Not Delete)

190

2/15/2018 5:30 PM

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXVIII:171

the anti-commandeering principle is its promotion of local political
accountability.115 She noted that when the “Federal Government
directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear
the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who
devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the
electoral ramifications of their decision.”116 Federal coercion
diminishes those officials’ accountability because they cannot respond
to the needs of the local electorate. Federal preemption of state law,
on the other hand, does not pose the same accountability problem
since federal officials make their decisions in the public’s eye and
“suffer the consequences” of unpopular decisions.117
In Printz, Justice Scalia suggested that another type of
accountability would be damaged by allowing the Federal
Government to commandeer the States: Congress’s own. The
Constitution, according to Justice Scalia, vests all the executive power
in the President “to ensure both vigor and accountability.”118 This
“would be shattered . . . if Congress could act as effectively without
the President as with him, by simply requiring state officers to execute
its laws.”119 Thus, by forcing the States to administer its laws instead
of the President or the President’s appointees, Congress could skirt its
own political accountability that stems from the fact that the
President is obliged to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”120
Printz and New York recognized that anti-commandeering is not
just politically beneficial. The principle also protects individuals
against the aggrandizement of power by either the federal or state
governments, alleviating the risk of tyranny and abuse by either. As
Justice Kennedy explained in his concurrence in Printz, “[t]he great
innovation of [the Constitution’s dual sovereignty design] was that
‘our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one
federal, each protected from incursion by the other.’”121 This
separation “is one of the Constitution’s structural protections of
concerned with state retention of regulatory control, the relevant questions sound in a distinctly
constitutional form of cost-benefit analysis.”).
115. See New York, 505 U.S. at 169.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 168.
118. Printz, 521 U.S. at 922.
119. Id. at 923.
120. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
121. Printz, 521 U.S. at 920 (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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liberty.”122 The ability of the Federal Government to conscript, at no
cost to itself, state officers or legislatures into its service trenches too
far into these personal liberties, leaving the citizenry vulnerable to a
massive consolidation of power by Congress or, perhaps more
credibly in modern times, the President.
The Constitutional scaffolding of New York and Printz suggests
three overarching things about the contours of the anticommandeering principle, which exist in some tension with each
other. First, the historical arguments for anti-commandeering
advanced in New York and Printz were not universally accepted by
the founding generation, especially with respect to the
commandeering of state officials. To the contrary, the AntiFederalists may have advocated for the commandeering of State
officials precisely because of its potential to maintain state power by
enhancing the States’ control over the implementation of federal law.
The Anti-Federalists may have also thought that commandeering
would enable States to maintain the loyalties of their citizens and
state officials, which might otherwise shift to the Federal Government
through federal patronage and employment. Perhaps for these
reasons, Congress historically avoided commandeering state
governments.
Second, while not compelled by precedent, the anticommandeering principle has doctrinal roots reaching back to some
of the earliest constitutional cases. The principle was based on the
recognition that, because the legislative powers of the States and
Congress overlap significantly, the Constitution’s dual sovereignty
could only be retained by implying a procedural limit on each of the
two governments’ ability to “impos[e] an obligation to obey” the
other.123
Third, the anti-commandeering principle seems to be an implied,
structural limit on Congress’s Article I powers, rather than an express
prohibition on the Congress’s exercise of otherwise enumerated
powers. The limit stems from the Constitution’s commitment to the
“separate and independent autonomy [of] the States.”124 The
122. Id. at 921.
123. Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. 1, 8 (1815); see also Young, supra note 111, at 58 (arguing that
the flaws of dual federalism’s commitment to separate substantive legislative spheres are multidirectional; just as it is problematic to defend states’ federalism at the expense of Congress’s
substantive powers, so is it problematic to overly police state infringement into traditionally
national areas like foreign affairs).
124. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (quoting Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 700, 725 (1869)).
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structural contours of the doctrine are informed by three
functionalist, prudential concerns regarding the evils of
commandeering, specifically that it: (1) interferes with local political
accountability; (2) could interfere with the Congress’s own
accountability; and (3) could deeply threaten personal liberty by
consolidating too much power in the Federal Government.
In sum, commandeering may have historically been understood
to enhance state control, whereas the modern anti-commandeering
doctrine views commandeering as a threat to State sovereignty,
individual liberties, and political accountability. Both views, however,
recognize the inevitable substantive overlap of State and Federal
Government legislative spheres. These countervailing considerations
suggest that the anti-commandeering principle is, at heart, a costbenefit analysis, balancing a recognition of broad national power with
the autonomy of State processes. In principle, it has the salutary
effect of increasing local and federal political accountability while
safeguarding personal liberties. However, it should not be read too
broadly lest it have the unwanted effect of consolidating too much
federal power.
V. THE ANTI-COMMANDEERING PRINCIPLE AND ANCILLARY
STATE REGULATORY BURDENS
Having explored the doctrinal and constitutional dimensions of
the anti-commandeering doctrine, this Part returns to the question
posed by West Virginia: whether the Clean Power Plan
unconstitutionally commandeers the States due to the fact that, even
if the States opt out, the federal plan cannot be implemented without
imposing ancillary regulatory burdens on state regulators. Putting
aside the ripeness issue with West Virginia’s challenge,125 the
argument still fails of its own force because it contravenes the
prudential and doctrinal framework of the anti-commandeering
principle.
Most damningly, West Virginia’s challenge would turn the
structural and prudential rationales of New York and Printz on their
heads, resulting in significantly less state autonomy, political

125. Since the federal plan has not yet been finalized, it may not be ripe for judicial review
and it may not be reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012)
(providing for judicial review of final agency action). On the other hand, the Court has not
always required that a controversy be live and immediate when other considerations weigh
heavily in favor of review. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 81–82
(1978).
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accountability, and personal security, because it would unravel many
cooperative federalist regulations126 and lead to much more
preemption of state law. As discussed above, the anti-commandeering
principle already exists in slight tension with the Anti-Federalists’
vision of enhancing state control by filtering federal programs
through state officials.127 But the two versions are not mutually
incompatible precisely because anti-commandeering promotes
cooperative federalism by requiring the Federal Government to
internalize the costs of its regulations.128 This, in turn, permits a
significant measure of state control over federal programs.129 In doing
so, the anti-commandeering doctrine is able to have its cake and eat it
too.
Without the option to costlessly co-opt state governments and
officials, the Federal Government must choose between preempting
States entirely or incentivizing them to cooperate. But because
federal preemption can be very costly to the Federal Government – it
is often politically unsavory, expensive, resource intensive, and
logistically difficult or impossible at times130 – cooperative federalism
126. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
127. See Siegel, supra note 114, at 1634.
128. But see Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 696 (2001) (arguing that Printz “suggested a possible return to
a vision of dual federalism and the possible invalidation of cooperative federalism regulatory
schemes.”). Others, however, have convincingly argued that Printz and other decisions rested
on a vision of “dual sovereignty” quite apart from dual federalism. E.g., Young, supra note 111,
at 66 (noting that “the horse of dual federalism is dead, and we should quit beating it.”).
129. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 70, at 1285–92.
130. These are all costs on the Federal Government itself. Presumably, the Federal
Government would also weigh the costs of reduced accountability and responsiveness, and the
opportunity costs of failing to use the States as laboratories of innovation that also stem from
federal preemption of local control. On the other hand, Professor Siegel has argued that the
anti-commandeering doctrine might cause more preemption than cooperative federalism. See
Siegel, supra note 114, at 1646 (arguing that “the unavailability of commandeering may result in
more instances of federal preemption going forward.”). Moreover, Professor Siegel sees little
difference between cooperative federalist frameworks like conditional spending and
commandeering in terms of the regulatory control exercised over state governments. Id. at 1657.
While it is true that with cooperative federalism, the State’s degree of discretion in the exercise
of federal programs is formally dictated by Congress, the States nevertheless have significant
latitude in choosing how to implement even relatively specific, bright-line programs. For
instance, North Carolina’s virtual non-compliance with many of the EPA’s delegated
environmental programs presents one powerful example of State autonomy within cooperative
federalist arrangements. See, e.g., Lilian Dorka, Letter of Concern to NC DEQ, EPA CIVIL
RIGHTS
COMPLIANCE
OFFICE
(Jan.
12,
2017),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3381929/NCDEQ-Letter-of-Concern-fromEPA.pdf (expressing concern that North Carolina was violating federal civil rights laws in its
implementation of the Clean Water Act); Keith Goldberg, EPA Threatens to Yank NC
Permitting
Authority,
LAW360
(Nov.
17,
2015,
4:55
PM),

Hennessee - Macros (Do Not Delete)

194

2/15/2018 5:30 PM

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXVIII:171

becomes a more attractive option. This option, as the Anti-Federalists
once hoped, empowers the States to “tweak, challenge, and even
dissent from federal law.”131
But taken to its logical end, West Virginia’s argument would
effectively destroy cooperative federalism as a viable alternative. It
would mean that Congress (or federal agencies acting pursuant to
delegated Congressional power) would be precluded from regulating
in an area whenever it would have the side effect of triggering other
state-law based regulatory burdens that would be shouldered by state
regulators. Congress would be left with two alternatives: either
preempt every area that might be incidentally impacted by a federal
regulation or refrain from regulating overlapping areas of state and
federal power altogether. Since the latter is unlikely, the inevitable
result would be much more federal preemption of state laws,
effectively unraveling the delicate cost-benefit balancing achieved in
New York and Printz.
Putting the prudence of the anti-commandeering principle aside,
West Virginia’s argument is not supported in the case law or in more
than a century of political practice. Congress has enacted statutes
based on cooperative federalism since the early 1900s,132 which, as
Justice Scalia emphasized in Printz, can be “‘weighty evidence’ of the
Constitution’s meaning.”133 Many of these regulations, like the EPA’s
Clean Power Plan, rely on state regulatory frameworks to ensure
their effective implementation.134 And, like the Clean Power Plan,
https://www.law360.com/energy/articles/727938/epa-threatens-to-yank-nc-permitting-authority
(EPA threatened to revoke North Carolina’s permitting authority under the Clean Air Act and
Clean Water Act because of the State’s efforts to limit citizens’ access to judicial review of
environmental permits).
131. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 70, at 1298. See also Heather K. Gerken, Our
Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1557 (2012). Gerken explains:
In cooperative regimes, states draw their power from their position as federal
servants, not separate sovereigns. As administrators of the federal regime,
states often have a great deal of discretion in carrying out federal policies.
The policymaking space in which they wield power is not the separate
regulatory carve-out imagined by champions of sovereignty and process
federalists. Instead, state policymakers wield power in the nooks and crannies
of the administrative system.
Id.
132. See generally JANE CLARK, THE RISE OF A NEW FEDERALISM (1938) (discussing the
burgeoning options for cooperative federalism in the New Deal era).
133. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714, 723–24 (1986)).
134. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1992) (recognizing the Clean
Water Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, and the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act as examples of regulations
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these regulations would require additional intervention by Congress if
the States were to decline to pick up the regulatory slack caused by
federal implementation of the regulations.135 Yet the Court in New
York expressly approved of these cooperative arrangements, noting
that:
[W]here Congress has the authority to regulate private
activity under the Commerce Clause, we have
recognized Congress’ power to offer States the choice of
regulating that activity according to federal standards or
having state law pre-empted by federal regulation. This
arrangement, which has been termed “a program of
cooperative federalism,” is replicated in numerous
federal statutory schemes. These include
the
Clean
Water Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act.136
Moreover, the Court has specifically declined to strike down
federal statutes simply because they inconvenience the States.137 For
instance, in Reno v. Condon, the Court unanimously rejected South
Carolina’s Tenth Amendment challenge to the Driver’s Privacy
Protection Act (DPPA), which restricts States’ ability to disclose
drivers’ personal information without their consent.138 The Court
acknowledged that “the DPPA’s provisions will require time and
effort on the part of state employees” but nevertheless declined to
find that it commandeered the States because the DPPA did “not
require the states in their sovereign capacity to regulate their own
citizens.”139 Likewise, in Printz, Justice Scalia suggested that an
“incidental application to the States of a federal law of general
applicability” would only be unconstitutional if it “excessively
interfered with the functioning of state governments.”140 The flaw
with the Brady Act was not that it burdened States, but that the
“whole object of the law [was] to direct the functioning of the state

relying on State regulatory frameworks).
135. See id.
136. Id. at 167–68 (citations omitted).
137. See Weiser, supra note 128, at 698 (predicting that “the Supreme Court will not
invalidate a federal regulatory program merely because it will consume a state’s time and
resources.”).
138. 528 U.S. 141, 150 (2000).
139. Id. at 150, 151.
140. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932 (1997).

Hennessee - Macros (Do Not Delete)

196

2/15/2018 5:30 PM

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXVIII:171

executive.”141 Even crediting West Virginia’s argument that the Clean
Power Plan will require time and effort on the part of state regulators,
this incident is not the “whole object” of the regulation, and it plainly
does not rise to the level of “excessively interfer[ing] with the
functioning of state governments.”142
Alternatively, it may be that West Virginia is using the anticommandeering principle as a back door to seek a new substantive
limit on Congress’s powers. In other words, the Federal Government
would be precluded from legislating in areas that are already heavily
regulated by the States, especially core issues of state interest like
power generation.143 The argument finds some support in Justice
O’Connor’s partial dissent in FERC.144 Responding to the majority’s
reasoning that the States “may escape PURPA simply by ceasing
regulation of public utilities,” Justice O’Connor argued that States
should not be forced to avoid regulating in areas of traditional State
concern to avoid the burdens imposed by a coercive federal
regulation.145 She stressed that “[u]tility regulation is a traditional
function of state government . . . By taxing [the State regulators’]
limited resources . . . and decreasing their ability to address local
regulatory ills, PURPA directly impairs the power of state utility
commissions to discharge their traditional functions efficiently and
effectively.”146
Nevertheless, Justice O’Connor stressed that Congress could still
preempt the field entirely, an alternative that “[t]he States might well
prefer.”147 Accordingly, it seems that Justice O’Connor was concerned
more with the mechanism of Congress’s exercise of its power than
with the substance. Moreover, to the extent that Justice O’Connor’s
anti-commandeering principle ever contained any substantive
components, she expressly disavowed them in New York, stating that
“[w]hile Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation
directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the States, the
Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the
ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. For instance, in its Opening Brief, West Virginia argues that the Clean Power Plan
“commandeers the States’ exclusive authority to regulate the intrastate generation and
transmission of electricity.” Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 79 (emphasis added).
144. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775–96 (1982).
145. Id. at 781.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 787.
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instructions.”148 Thus, to the extent that West Virginia’s argument
leads to the conclusion that Congress is substantively constrained
from regulating in “areas of intimate concern” to the States, it has no
support in the modern anti-commandeering doctrine.149
West Virginia’s best argument might be that Congress has not
delegated to the EPA the authority to preempt the States in the areas
of state law that will be affected by the Clean Power Plan, and
therefore the federal plan necessarily relies on state cooperation in its
implementation. It is true that if the States were to refuse to
implement the permitting, ratemaking adjustments and other
incidental regulatory burdens of the federal plan, the EPA would
likely be unable to achieve the 32% overall carbon emission
reductions it is seeking. It would have to go to Congress to ask for
authority to preempt these traditional areas of state law. Still, the
argument proves too much. If every federal regulation that relies on
States to shoulder incidental burdens were unconstitutional, either
the entire regulatory state would collapse or Congress would have to
enact vast swaths of new legislation regulating areas that have
historically been the domain of the States. More than
commandeering, it would be an all-out annihilation of State
autonomy. The anti-commandeering principle surely does not go that
far.150
VI. CONCLUSION
Though not compelled by constitutional history or precedent, the
anti-commandeering doctrine is a convincing structural and
prudential reading of the Constitution’s commitment to dual
sovereignty, which recognizes Congress’s expansive national power
while retaining States’ procedural autonomy. It draws a bright-line
rule, which makes it administrable in a way that the Court’s “sordid”
pre-1937 Tenth Amendment doctrine was not. And it also enhances
state autonomy, political accountability, and personal security by
promoting cooperative federalist statutes where the State and Federal
Governments work together to implement federal programs.

148. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (emphasis added).
149. Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. 1, 8 (1815).
150. To the extent West Virginia’s argument has any merit, it is statutory, not constitutional.
It might be that Congress, which has historically been relatively deferential to States’ control
over their power sectors, did not intend for the EPA to exercise its power under the Clean Air
Act in ways that would impinge on this domain.
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West Virginia’s reading of the anti-commandeering doctrine
would undermine all of these values. Under West Virginia’s
understanding of the doctrine, federal legislation and regulations that
necessarily imposed incidental burdens on state regulators would be
unconstitutional, which would likely lead to Congress preempting
huge swaths of traditional state law. Ultimately, this would
significantly undermine State autonomy in ways that are not intended
or sanctioned by the anti-commandeering principle.

